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OPENING PANDORA’S JURY BOX 
B. Samantha Helgason* 
 
More than sixty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Remmer v. 
United States, thereby defining what procedural steps restore a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial in the face of a contaminated or partial 
jury.  Remmer, a case replete with evidence of jury tampering and covert 
investigations, fashioned the remedy for future courts to redress allegations 
of jury taint.  Upon making out a prima facie case, a defendant is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing, at which the evidence is presumed to prejudice the 
defendant, and the government bears the burden of rebutting.  In Remmer’s 
wake, however, the Court issued two subsequent opinions that some circuits 
have interpreted to obviate the presumption of prejudice and restrict 
Remmer’s rule. 
This Note observes the inconsistent effects of the current circuit split on 
defendants’ rights at trial, and it contends that the disparity will increase as 
technology dissolves access barriers between jurors and outside information.  
This Note examines where Supreme Court jurisprudence, circuit procedure, 
and habeas corpus doctrine have shaped the current circuit split.  It then 
proposes that circuits can mend the split and pave a unified path forward by 
reframing their analyses to include three additional considerations.  Further, 
by separating allegations of jury taint into three subcategories, circuits can 
renew Remmer’s pretechnology rule to properly address jury taint in a 
digital age.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Insulating juries from outside influence has long challenged courts.1  
Judges rely on procedural safeguards, and they trust jurors to uphold the oath 
sworn upon induction into the jury box.  Yet, despite agreement on the 
various procedural tools that protect jurors from outside influence, courts 
frequently disagree over what procedures properly sanitize a jury once it has 
been contaminated. 
Over the last fifteen years, courts have noted the rise of the “Google 
mistrial”—a result of jurors conducting outside research during trials they 
 
 1.  “Any judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of forms they are extremely 
likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.” Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 
(1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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observe.2  In 2009, a juror in a federal drug trial3 caused the judge to declare 
a mistrial after he admitted to having researched the ongoing case online.4  
The defendant stood trial for eight weeks, fighting charges for the sale of 
prescription drugs through internet pharmacies.5  Both the federal 
prosecutors and the defense attorneys had poured countless hours and costs 
into preparing, trying, and defending the case.6  After the parties had 
concluded their arguments and sent the jury to begin its deliberations, one of 
the jurors approached the judge and informed him that another juror had both 
conducted online research during the trial and shared the results with the 
other jurors.7 
While questioning the juror, the judge learned the juror had uncovered 
evidence that the court had specifically excluded from the proceedings.8  In 
questioning the jury as a whole, the judge then learned that eight additional 
jurors had also conducted outside research online.9  They admitted to 
combing through Google for coverage about the case, searching for the 
lawyers and the defendant, looking for outside evidence, and using 
Wikipedia to define legal terms.10  When asked why, one juror responded, 
“Well, I was curious.”11  One of the defense attorneys was admittedly 
stunned, describing it as a heartbreak and noting this as the “first time modern 
technology [had] struck us in that fashion.”12 
While this case depicts an obvious waste of time, money, and court 
resources, the judge was able to cure a potential miscarriage of justice by 
declaring a mistrial.13  But what happens when jurors are less candid or 
forthcoming with the judge?  In a separate case around the same time, the 
media reported on a different defendant’s trial in another part of the 
country.14  A juror admitted to fellow juror Seth McDowell that she had run 
a Google search on the defendant despite the court’s explicit instructions not 
to.15  McDowell said he considered informing the judge, but he then 
dismissed the thought and wrapped up the remainder of his jury duty.16  The 
 
 2. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html [https://perma.cc/RA38-
UU43]. 
 3. United States v. Hernandez, No. 07-60027-CR (S.D. Fla. defendant’s motion for 
mistrial granted Mar. 10, 2009). 
 4. Schwartz, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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trial concluded after only two days, and McDowell later confessed that it may 
have lasted much longer had “everybody d[one] the right thing.”17 
Courts have long sought to protect jurors from third-party interference.18  
And while this threat surely exists, courts largely agree on how to address 
tampering.19  Now, advancements in technology introduce new threats to jury 
impartiality.20  The immediacy with which jurors may examine a wealth of 
information at their fingertips makes them prone to misconduct.21  Jurors are 
already accustomed to researching and verifying information before 
committing to decisions in their private lives.22  Then, as jurors, they want to 
feel especially informed given the life-altering impacts of their decisions.23  
Consequently, this tendency permits smart devices to infiltrate proceedings 
as Trojan horses—silent sources of outside information resting within each 
juror’s pocket.24 
In an atmosphere where courts require full control over the type and 
quantity of information their jurors consume, such quick and easy access to 
the outside world creates a rampant problem.25  This threat becomes even 
more apparent as courts contemplate how to rely on technology.  For 
instance, in 2020, many courts have had to consider whether to conduct 
virtual criminal proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic.26  Without an 
ability to gather jurors in person, courts now question what mechanisms, if 
any, can properly insulate and monitor a jury.27 
This Note28 explores the myriad of ways in which federal circuit courts 
have identified and redressed evolving instances of taint since the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s initial decision in Remmer v. United States.29  Circuits have 
interpreted Supreme Court precedent to create procedure for situations in 
which outside influences may prejudice a verdict.  Part I defines the role of 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1892) (describing potential 
prejudice from a jury’s exposure to third parties), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017); Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1943) (“The law 
is that communications, relative to a case on trial, between jurors and third persons, or 
witnesses, or the officer in charge of the jury, are absolutely forbidden . . . .”). 
 19. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.2 (discussing Remmer’s progeny). 
 20. Claire C. Kates, Protecting the Impartial Jury:  A Solution of Questions, 35 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 423 (2016). 
 21. Id. at 423–26. 
 22. Roy Futterman, Perspective, Are We Driving Jurors to the Internet?, BLOOMBERG L. 
(Aug. 10, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/are-we-
driving-jurors-to-the-internet-perspective [https://perma.cc/G74L-9S3K]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See AM. BAR ASS’N JUD. DIV. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, A FAIR TRIAL:  
JURORS USE OF DEVICES AND THE INTERNET 4 (2010), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0026/13769/fairtrialhandbookauthcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AMU-
MPEP]. 
 25. See id.; Futterman, supra note 22. 
 26. See infra Part III.D (discussing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on jury trials). 
 27. See infra Part III.D. 
 28. This Note addresses cases at different stages of the appeals process.  To maintain 
consistency throughout, this Note refers to the accused as “defendant” or “habeas petitioner.” 
 29. 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 
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the jury, discusses its importance in preserving the constitutionality of trials, 
and assesses the varying degrees to which presumptions may define 
procedure.  Part I also examines the seminal Supreme Court cases that have 
delineated such procedures.  Part II then reviews how circuits have 
interpreted those holdings to allocate procedural entitlements and burdens to 
litigants, further noting where habeas procedure complicates courts’ analyses 
and exacerbates the underlying disagreement.  Part III argues that circuits 
evaluate allegations of jury taint through narrow lenses, ignoring three 
important considerations that would otherwise harmonize Supreme Court 
case law.  It offers alternate subcategories for how courts should consider 
jury taint in the face of advancing technology.  This Note concludes that 
reading the Supreme Court cases together best equips courts to confront jury 
taint in the digital era. 
I.  DEFINING THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
This part first explores Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing in turn 
on the establishment of an impartial jury and the use of presumptions.  It then 
reviews how Supreme Court case law laid the foundation for redressing 
extraneous influence on juries. 
A.  The Sixth Amendment and the Role of a Jury 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees each criminal defendant in a federal 
proceeding the constitutional right to trial “by an impartial jury.”30  The 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause incorporated the Sixth 
Amendment’s protections against the states, giving both state and federal 
criminal defendants the same right to fair proceedings before an impartial 
jury.31  As such, the jury is a cornerstone of the American legal system.32 
Since this country’s founding, the judiciary has entrusted juries to find 
facts and come to conclusions by applying the appropriate law to those 
facts.33  Jurors must remain impartial, valuing their life experiences on one 
hand and acting as “blank slates” on which litigants paint the case’s facts and 
 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  However, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not 
extend to petty criminal offenses. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury—Supreme Court Cases, 6 A.L.R. Fed. 
2d 213 § 5 (2005). 
 31. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). 
 32. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS 15 (2019) http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/jury/ 
jurortrialhandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3JT-UGQX] (“The effectiveness of the democratic 
system itself is largely measured by the integrity, the intelligence, and the general quality of 
citizenship of the jurors who serve in our courts.”). 
 33. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (“[T]he jury, aided by the court 
must judge . . . .  [And] hav[ing] now heard the opinion of the court on the law of the case[,] 
[t]hey will apply that law to the facts, and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their 
own consciences may direct.” (alternation in original) (quoting Sparf v. United States, 156 
U.S. 51, 67 (1895))). 
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law on the other.34  Because the jury is integral to the legal system, courts go 
to great lengths to protect the privacy, even the sanctity, of the jury box.35 
During the initial stages of their duty,36 jurors swear or affirm an oath to 
decide a case based solely upon the law and evidence presented at trial.37  
The jurors are purposefully insulated through this process to position a 
presiding judge as the only permissible source of information.38  A court both 
supplies a jury with the applicable law and selects what evidence the jury 
may consider.39 
Further, jurors swear to disregard their personal prejudices and to return 
verdicts according to their best judgment.40  They may draw upon 
experience, common sense, and common knowledge, but they may not rely 
on outside sources of information.41  Jurors who do learn outside information 
or who are approached by third parties seeking to influence the proceedings 
must inform the court.42  Jurors may also not communicate in person or 
electronically about the case,43 prematurely deliberate,44 or read45 or listen 
to information regarding the case.46 
Even still, outside influence occasionally pierces the procedural walls 
designed to shield the jury box.47  Jurors may taint the proceedings through 
their own actions.48  These actions include reaching out to third parties, 
conducting outside research, testing the evidence, defining legal terms 
through outside means, making untruthful statements during voir dire, 
broadcasting confidential information from the proceedings to the general 
 
 34. Richard Lorren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV. 713, 715 
(2019); see also JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 32, at 12 (“The words of Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from over a century ago apply with equal force to jurors 
serving in this advanced technological age:  ‘The theory of our system is that the conclusions 
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not 
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.’” (quoting Patterson v. 
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907))). 
 35. See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing each circuit’s procedure for redressing threats of 
extraneous influence); see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (“[T]he 
impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system.”). 
 36. This Note will not discuss the creation of grand jury panels, decisions to indict, 
arraignments, or other procedural steps preceding criminal trials.  It further assumes 
familiarity with initial voir dire examinations and jury selection. 
 37. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 32, at 8. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. Id.; see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).  
 42. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 32, at 11, 13. 
 43. Id. at 11–12 (explicitly listing communications and social networking “on computers, 
netbooks, tablets, and smart phones” and “any” internet service or “instant messaging service, 
RSS feed, or other automatic alert that may transmit information regarding the case to the 
juror; or any Internet chat room, blog, or website”). 
 44. Id. at 11. 
 45. Id. (prohibiting newspapers, dictionaries, and reference materials both electronic and 
paper). 
 46. Id. (instructing jurors to “avoid radio, television, and Internet broadcasts”). 
 47. See infra Parts II.A–B (giving case examples). 
 48. E.g., supra notes 2–17 and accompanying text. 
2020] OPENING PANDORA’S JURY BOX 237 
public, or deliberating with other jurors prematurely.49  Alternatively, they 
may fall victim to third-party interference.  These actions include outside 
efforts to tamper with the jury by threat, suggestion, or bribery, and they 
encompass accidental forms of influence like media coverage or newspaper 
headlines that bleed into jurors’ daily routines.50  Regardless of the form, 
extraneous information has the potential to infect a jury and infringe on a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.51 
Where it does, the question becomes:  To what extent has outside contact 
violated that defendant’s rights?52  Has the transgression stepped on the 
defendant’s right to due process?53  Did it strike the heart of the Sixth 
Amendment?54  To answer these questions, courts pivot to identify the source 
of intrusion and to understand its impact on jurors and their verdicts.55 
B.  Balance Through Presumptions 
One way courts may counteract the potential impact of outside information 
is to implement a presumption.56  A rebuttable presumption is an assumption 
of fact that courts accept as true until an opposing party contests it.57  Rather 
than proving a fact outright, litigants presume a fact by relying on 
circumstantial evidence that creates a reasonable belief that a probable chain 
of events occurred.58  Where a court grants one party a presumption, the 
opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to rebut.59  In the 
absence of such evidence, the opposing party fails to carry its burden of 
production, and the presumption stands.60  However, where that party 
satisfies its burden of production, it overcomes and voids the presumption.61 
 
 49. Timothy J. Fallon, Mistrial in 140 Characters or Less?:  How the Internet and Social 
Networking Are Undermining the American Jury System and What Can Be Done to Fix It, 38 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 935, 938–43 (2010); Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict:  The 
Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 324 (2005). 
 50. See Gershman, supra note 49, at 328–39. 
 51. See United States v. Blagojevich, 743 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (discussing 
how attempts to communicate with jurors endanger a defendant’s right to a fair trial). 
 52. See infra Part I.C (explaining the creation of a Remmer hearing, by which courts may 
explore the impact of outside influence on the verdict). 
 53. See generally Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (differentiating between the 
remedies for due process and for Sixth Amendment violations). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Cf. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 378–79 (2010) (positing that the point at 
which media coverage and publicity influence jurors’ ability to remain impartial is a case-by-
case determination). 
 57. Rebuttable Presumption Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rebuttable-presumption [https://perma.cc/M8E4-4HV4] (last 
visited June 22, 2020). 
 58. Paul F. Rothstein, Demystifying Burdens of Proof and the Effect of Rebuttable 
Evidentiary Presumptions in Civil and Criminal Trials 3 (Oct. 11, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3050687 [https://perma.cc/83MR-44DA]. 
 59. Id. at 65. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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Jurisdictions rely on underlying policies, rationale, and judicial discretion 
to develop a presumption’s ultimate force.62  As presumptions come from a 
society’s shared assumptions about how the world works, the extent to which 
a society accepts something as true influences that presumption’s force.63  A 
court then molds the rigor of a presumption’s legal effect by assigning 
different evidentiary burdens to the litigants.64 
In the criminal context, presumptions already shape how the law attributes 
rights to the accused and how to conduct trials.  Perhaps most commonly 
recognized, defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty.65  The 
government bears the burden of putting forth evidence sufficient to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and only a showing of that caliber can 
overcome the presumption of innocence.66  Similarly, juries are presumed to 
be impartial.67  The challenger—usually the accused—bears the initial 
burden of demonstrating partiality to overcome a presumption of 
impartiality.68 
The presumption of prejudice, which this Note examines in detail, arises 
once outside influence is alleged to have reached the jury.69  As a jury may 
strip the accused of life or liberty, ensuring juror impartiality is paramount.70  
In response, instating a presumption of prejudice acts to restore balance to 
potentially partial proceedings.71  It serves to safeguard a defendant’s 
fundamental right to a fair trial.72 
C.  Supreme Court History 
This section explores the trilogy of cases that established the framework 
through which courts redress credible allegations of jury taint.  It then turns 
to explain per se prejudice, which defines the upper limit of presumed 
prejudice.  Taken together, these cases have built the legal sandbox in which 
courts confronting potentially contaminated juries begin their analyses. 
 
 62. See id. at 21–22. 
 63. Id. at 17 n.35.  For example, society presumes that upon mailing a letter, and not 
having seen it returned, that letter arrived safely to its recipient.  The high probability of proper 
mailing resulting in arrival informs society’s common experience and common sense.  It 
becomes a safe assumption. Id. 
 64. Id. at 21. 
 65. The presumption of innocence first took shape in Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 
664, 682 (1896). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1961). 
 68. Id. at 723; see, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 247–51 (1910) (alleging juror 
partiality); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1879) (same). 
 69. See infra Parts I.C.1–2, II. 
 70. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722. 
 71. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (requiring the government to 
proffer evidence that rebuts a presumption of prejudice). 
 72. See infra Parts I.C.1–2. 
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1.  Three Foundational Cases 
The 1954 Supreme Court case Remmer v. United States established that 
extrajudicial communication with a jury merits an evidentiary hearing at 
which all parties may gather to determine the extent of harm to a defendant’s 
trial.73  In Remmer, an unnamed person approached a juror, who would later 
become the jury foreman, and suggested that the juror could profit if he 
delivered a verdict favorable to the defendant.74  The juror reported this 
interaction to the judge, who conferred with the prosecuting attorneys prior 
to their opening an FBI investigation.75  The FBI then conducted its 
investigation only to conclude that the third party’s comment was made in 
jest and did not pose a threat to the ongoing trial.76 
However, throughout the process, neither the judge nor the prosecuting 
attorneys had informed defense counsel of the incident or ongoing 
investigation.77  In fact, defense counsel first learned of the ex parte 
exchanges from reading a newspaper article after his client had been 
convicted.78  Subsequently, the defendant moved for a new trial and 
requested a hearing to examine whether the incident had deprived him of a 
fair trial.79 
The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a hearing, after which the 
defendant appealed his case up to the Supreme Court.80  The Court explained 
the following standard, incidentally laying the foundation on which circuits 
have disagreed for decades: 
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, 
directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending 
before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, 
if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions 
and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the 
parties.81 
Thus, the Court established that a defendant’s prima facie showing of jury 
taint minimally entitles him to an evidentiary hearing.82  As the trial court in 
Remmer had not yet convened a hearing, the Court could not discern what 
events had transpired or whether the alleged incidents had in fact harmed the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.83  The Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
 
 73. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30. 
 74. Id. at 228. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 228–29. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 229. 
 80. Id. at 229–30. 
 81. Id. at 229. 
 82. Jesse Gessin, Bit by Bit:  Breaking Down the Ninth Circuit’s Frameworks for Jury 
Misconduct in the Digital Age, 18 NEV. L.J. 709, 714 (2018) (noting the creation of evidentiary 
hearings known as “Remmer hearings”). 
 83. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. 
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against the defendant with instructions to convene a hearing to discern the 
harm.84 
Tucked within this holding lingers the question of whether the defendant’s 
prima facie showing of jury taint also entitles him to a presumption of 
prejudice at the evidentiary hearing.85  The Remmer Court found the 
extrajudicial contact to be “presumptively prejudicial,” and it charged the 
government with showing harmlessness.86  That is, the defendant’s prima 
facie showing shifted the burden to the government to produce evidence.  
Unless the government could demonstrate that the third party’s comments 
had not harmed the jury’s verdict, the Court would presume that the contact 
had prejudiced the trial and would vacate the conviction. 
In Remmer’s wake, however, circuit courts have construed the following 
two Supreme Court cases to cloud or even overturn the rule promulgated in 
Remmer.  First, in Smith v. Phillips,87 the Court denied a defendant’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, reasoning that the defendant’s claim of juror 
partiality was insufficient to merit a new trial.88  In this case, one of the jurors 
had applied for employment with the District Attorney’s Office, but neither 
the trial court nor defense counsel had learned of the juror’s application until 
after the jury had returned its guilty verdict.89  Justice William Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court, explained that “the remedy for allegations of juror 
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove 
actual bias.”90  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, recognizing that the majority’s 
view might prove too absolute, concurred to explain that the Court’s opinion 
here would not foreclose the use of implied bias in all instances.91 
Eleven years later, the Court returned to Remmer’s rule again in United 
States v. Olano.92  Here, the trial court allowed two alternate jurors to observe 
jury deliberations.93  On appeal, the defendant contended that the alternate 
jurors’ presence during deliberations had undermined their ability to be 
impartial.94  Justice O’Connor, this time writing for the Court, reiterated a 
similar standard to the one she had espoused in her concurrence in Phillips.95  
She departed from the focus on presumptions, and she instead encouraged 
courts to ask whether the intrusion influenced the ultimate verdict.96  Not 
 
 84. Id. at 230. 
 85. Id. at 229. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
 88. Id. at 217 (asserting that a ruling in the defendant’s favor would render “few trials . . . 
constitutionally acceptable” as “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors” from every potential 
influence). 
 89. Id. at 212–13. 
 90. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 224 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 92. 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
 93. Id. at 729–30. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 738–39; see also Phillips, 455 U.S. at 223 (discussing judicial discretion). 
 96. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739 (“[B]ut a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific 
analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry:  Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations 
and thereby its verdict?”). 
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every case should presume prejudice, and the presence of alternate jurors did 
not entail a “sufficient risk” of harm to justify such a presumption.97  Thus, 
Olano established that only certain types of taint may trigger a presumption 
of prejudice, and courts should investigate how the intrusion influenced the 
verdict prior to granting one.98 
2.  Defining Per Se Prejudice 
During the years between Remmer and Phillips, the Court also defined the 
kind of contact that per se prejudices a defendant.99  Where jury taint 
definitively prejudices the defendant, as in these two cases below, a court 
need not grapple with Remmer’s line of cases.  On its face, the contact has 
impaired the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and merits reversal.  Thus, 
the following two holdings structure the boundary between contact that 
presumptively prejudices and per se prejudices a verdict. 
In Turner v. Louisiana,100 two deputy sheriffs who served as principal 
witnesses for the prosecution simultaneously supervised the jury, 
transporting the jurors between meals and lodging each day.101  In Parker v. 
Gladden,102 the bailiff responsible for marshaling the jury declared his belief 
to one juror that the defendant was guilty and wicked.103 
In both cases, the Court identified the official character of the deputy 
sheriffs and bailiff as capable of greatly influencing a jury’s perception.104  
Both the deputies and the bailiff were responsible for protecting and escorting 
the jury—a role that inherently garners trust and confidence.  The Court 
determined that such association with jurors, especially where positioned to 
foster rapport prior to jury deliberations, had infected the jurors with 
prejudice sufficient to reverse those convictions.105  Accordingly, Remmer’s 
presumption did not apply to per se instances of taint.  The presumption 
 
 97. Id. at 741.  Some circuits have perceived this as Justice O’Connor seemingly 
substituting judicial guardrails for procedure and calling on courts to use their experience to 
discern when to apply the presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 225–
26 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 98. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 737; see also United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 642 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (interpreting Olano as framing the inquiry as either a Remmer presumption or as “a 
specific analysis”). 
 99. See generally Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
466 (1965). 
 100. 379 U.S. 466 (1965). 
 101. Id. at 467–68. 
 102. 385 U.S. 363 (1966). 
 103. Id. at 363. 
 104. See id. at 365 (finding that the bailiff’s role “as an officer of the court as well as the 
State” weighed greatly with the jury); Turner, 379 U.S. at 474 (describing the association with 
the jury as “even more prejudicial” since they were deputies). 
 105. Parker, 385 U.S. at 365–66; Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 474.  Justice John Marshall 
Harlan dissented in Parker, categorizing the bailiff’s commentary as “no more than 
inconsequential incidents in an otherwise constitutionally flawless proceeding.” Parker, 385 
U.S. at 369.  His dissent highlights the brewing tension over what calculus of prejudice 
conclusively strips a defendant of a fair trial. See id. 
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instead lives in the murky space between per se prejudice and harmless 
contact. 
Ultimately, the sporadic handful of Supreme Court cases on this matter 
have confused circuits about what contact to presume prejudicial and by 
which standard to evaluate alleged taint.  Circuits have therefore diverged in 
their interpretations of Remmer’s presumption.  While they agree that a prima 
facie showing entitles a defendant to a hearing, Remmer left unanswered 
whether that showing presumes prejudice and reallocates the burden of proof 
to the government.106  The perceived ambiguity of, first, whether Remmer 
created a burden-shifting framework and, second, whether the subsequent 
cases dissolved its standard has challenged courts for years. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND PROCEDURAL OVERLAY 
This part observes how circuit courts have grappled with Remmer’s 
presumption and whether to apply it or one of its successors’ analyses.  Some 
circuits, “Remmer circuits,” have attributed the Remmer Court’s language to 
create and apply a burden-shifting framework to questions of jury taint.107  
These courts view Remmer to have clearly entitled a defendant to an 
evidentiary hearing and to a presumption of prejudice.108  In contrast, other 
circuits, “Phillips circuits,” reason that the plain language of Phillips 
eliminated any prior entitlement to a presumption.109  The remaining circuits, 
“Olano circuits,” have construed the line of cases to narrow the 
presumption’s applicability to a few types of cases.110  While circuits agree 
that a prima facie showing entitles a defendant to a hearing, they disagree 
over whether it further creates a presumption of prejudice.111 
This part analyzes how circuits have crafted their procedures to balance 
considerations imposed by unclear precedent, constitutional rights, and 
evolving technologies.  Part II.A examines Remmer circuits, and Part II.B 
analyzes the Phillips and Olano circuits.  Part II.C explores how the 
procedural posture of habeas corpus proceedings informs a defendant’s rights 
and to what degree such posture limits a federal court’s review of state court 
findings. 
A.  Remmer Circuits 
Remmer circuits reiterate the defendant’s right to a presumption of 
prejudice under the foundational case—Remmer.  Yet, even where these 
circuits coalesce to defend an entitlement to the presumption, they disagree 
as to what kind of outside exposure triggers it and as to the degree of force 
 
 106. Compare United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 641 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
Remmer entitles the defendant to a presumption), with United States v. Davis, 407 F. App’x 
32, 36 (6th Cir. 2011) (confining Remmer’s entitlement to only a hearing). 
 107. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Remmer circuits within the circuit split). 
 108. See, e.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 242 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 109. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Phillips circuits). 
 110. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Olano circuits). 
 111. See infra Parts II.A–C (contrasting cases). 
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such presumption carries at a hearing.  For instance, should a presumption 
immediately attach whenever a defendant makes out a prima facie showing?  
If so, does that presumption also automatically shift the burden? 
The following sections discuss how the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have implemented the rights and 
procedures they interpret to flow from Remmer.  It explores where each of 
these circuits has diverged in construing a defendant’s entitlement. 
1.  Hypothetical Average Juror:  The Second and Third Circuits 
The Second112 and Third Circuits113 use a “hypothetical juror” method to 
assess the potential effects of outside influence.  Pursuant to Remmer, the 
Second Circuit holds that a jury’s exposure to extrinsic information 
necessitates an evidentiary hearing, at which the government may rebut the 
presumption of prejudice by showing harmlessness.114  Extrarecord 
information triggers the presumption, and the government may only defeat it 
by demonstrating that outside influence would not have affected a 
hypothetical average juror.115 
The Second Circuit analyzes both the nature of the outside influence and 
its probable effect on an average juror to ensure the analysis remains 
objective.116  In United States v. Morrison,117 an unnamed third party 
attempted to bribe the jury foreman to induce a verdict favorable to the 
defendant.118  The jury foreman did not report this encounter during trial, and 
he only disclosed the incident once the jury had delivered its conviction and 
the trial had concluded.119  Upon learning of the attempted bribery, the 
district court convened a Remmer hearing.120 
 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 580 F. App’x 20, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2002).  The court made an “independent 
determination” as to whether the extrinsic evidence would have influenced “a hypothetical, 
average juror” and rejected the defendant’s claim, finding it would not have. Id. at 166–67, 
174. 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 304 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 114. United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2002); Greer, 285 F.3d at 167; 
United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1985); Eva Kerr, Note, Prejudice, 
Procedure, and a Proper Presumption:  Restoring the Remmer Presumption of Prejudice in 
Order to Protect Criminal Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1451, 1470 
(2008). 
 115. Greer, 285 F.3d at 173; United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1064 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 116. See United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168–70 (2d Cir. 2011); Greer, 285 F.3d 
at 173. 
 117. 580 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 118. Id. at 21. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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As a court in a Remmer circuit, the district court presumed the contact to 
have prejudiced the verdict and asked the government to show otherwise.121  
The government argued that the length of jury deliberations and the 
conviction itself evidenced harmlessness.122  Nevertheless, the court 
reasoned that attempted bribery would have surely troubled a hypothetical 
average juror under the same circumstances.123  The government had 
therefore failed to carry its burden, and the court presumed the contact to 
have compromised the jury foreman’s ability to remain impartial.124  
Accordingly, the district court granted a new trial.125 
While the Third Circuit also reads Remmer to presume prejudice, it does 
not find the presumption particularly useful.126  Third Circuit courts rely on 
Remmer’s language that “the presumption is not conclusive”127 to reduce the 
presumption’s weight within a hearing.128  Upon learning that extraneous 
information or contact has reached the jury, a Third Circuit district court 
conducts voir dire of its jurors and asks whether the jurors can remain 
impartial.129  The district court examines the jurors’ answers in conjunction 
with the case’s facts to determine the possibility of prejudice.130  Thus, while 
recognizing a presumption in name, Third Circuit courts neither assign a 
burden to the government nor ask the government to rebut.131  Rather, juror 
responses during voir dire fulfill this role, and the judge determines whether 
the answers affirm or deny the possibility of prejudice.132 
On appeal, the Third Circuit asks whether the extraneous influence or 
contact would have impacted a hypothetical average juror’s impartiality and 
subjects the defendant to “substantial prejudice.”133  Without finding 
substantial prejudice to the defendant, the Third Circuit concludes that voir 
dire has redressed the alleged taint.134  In one case, two jurors allegedly 
violated the district court’s instructions not to seek outside information.135  
Juror One posted updates about trial proceedings and jury deliberations to 
 
 121. See id. (discussing how the presumption applies when a juror is exposed to 
extrajudicial influence). 
 122. Id. at 22. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See United States v. Zgrzepski, 323 F. App’x 177, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2002); cf. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 
643 (4th Cir. 2012) (considering the Third Circuit to not be among the Remmer circuits and 
categorizing it as only applying a presumption under serious circumstances). 
 127. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). 
 128. See Vega, 285 F.3d at 266. 
 129. Id. at 266; United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 130. Vega, 285 F.3d at 266. 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 307 (3d Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the 
court need not determine which party bears the burden of showing prejudice). 
 132. See Vega, 285 F.3d at 256; Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 90. 
 133. United States v. Zgrzepski, 323 F. App’x 177, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 301 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 134. Zgrzepski, 323 F. App’x at 183–84. 
 135. Fumo, 655 F.3d at 304–06. 
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social media.136  Shortly after, news outlets discovered Juror One’s posts and 
began featuring them on the evening news.137  Juror One watched the evening 
news, where newscasters then discussed the posts and trial at length.138  
Additionally, Juror Two learned from her coworkers of the defendant’s prior 
convictions—evidence the judge had specifically excluded.139  Despite the 
defendant’s arguments that both jurors’ outside contacts had influenced the 
ultimate verdict, the Third Circuit found the alleged conduct to fall short of 
producing substantial prejudice.140  By intervening only in cases of 
substantial prejudice, the Third Circuit affords district courts broad latitude 
to determine the merits of alleged taint through voir dire. 
2.  More than Innocuous:  The Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
Separately, the Fourth141 and Seventh142 Circuits apply Remmer’s 
presumption to minimal showings of extraneous contact.  For instance, the 
Fourth Circuit applies the presumption to extrajudicial conduct that rises 
above “innocuous” contact.143 
Under this standard, the Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction 
for facilitating animal fighting when one juror used Wikipedia to search the 
term “sponsor”—an element of the offense at issue.144  Because the word this 
juror sought to define was integral to understanding the offense, the Fourth 
Circuit found that a confirmation of this search met the prima facie burden, 
and it automatically applied Remmer’s presumption.145  The government was 
then unable to carry its burden to show that the juror’s internet search did not 
affect the verdict, and the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant’s 
conviction.146  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit not only applies Remmer’s 
presumption and the accompanying automatic burden-shifting framework, 
but it comparatively places a greater burden on the government’s rebuttal 
than on the defendant’s initial showing. 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 306. 
 140. Id. at 306–07. 
 141. For examples of cases citing minimal or innocuous contact, see United States v. 
Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 639–42 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th 
Cir. 1996). 
 142. Seventh Circuit courts do not apply a presumption when allegations are ambiguous or 
innocuous. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 692 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Delatorre, 572 F. Supp. 2d 967, 993–94 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 2020) (discussing the 
standard and identifying behavior that is not innocuous and merits an evidentiary hearing).  
For an example of contact that is innocuous, and therefore does not make out a prima facie 
showing, see United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490, 504–05 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 144. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 634, 651 (holding that juror misconduct interfered with the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial). 
 145. Id. at 645. 
 146. Id. at 646–51. 
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Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit requires a minimal prima facie 
showing.147  In one case, a juror informed the court nine days after the close 
of evidence that someone had written “GUILTY” in a notebook she had used 
for trial.148  She reported the notation as threatening, which the Seventh 
Circuit ultimately found sufficient to merit a hearing on appeal.149  The 
circuit court presumed that the incident prejudiced the defendant’s trial and 
required the government to rebut.150  Yet, the trial court’s record was 
incomplete, leaving the government without the ability to carry its burden.151  
In the absence of evidence, the Seventh Circuit found that only a mistrial 
could cure a possible impairment of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right.152 
Ultimately, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits implement lower prima facie 
thresholds, which more readily permit defendants to allege jury taint in 
different contexts.  As both circuits also shift the burden to the government, 
their flexible interpretations of a prima facie showing produce more 
protective views of the Sixth Amendment than those of their sister circuits. 
3.  Overlooking Misconduct:  The Tenth Circuit 
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit limits Remmer’s presumption to cases of 
third-party contact with the jury about the matter pending before it.153  As 
such, the Tenth Circuit’s view has excluded various instances of juror 
misconduct from review.154  For instance, the Tenth Circuit expressly 
declined to apply Remmer when a potential juror shared outside information 
about the impending trial with other potential jurors during voir dire.155  The 
court reasoned that Remmer pertains only to communications regarding the 
trial between jurors and third parties.156  Consequently, a juror’s own actions 
do not enter into Remmer terrain, and only third-party influences invoke its 
application. 
Given the contrast between the Tenth Circuit’s view and the Fourth 
Circuit’s above, these two circuits would draw different conclusions 
regarding the juror who used Wikipedia to define an element of the alleged 
 
 147. See supra note 142 (providing examples of cases using a minimal threshold). 
 148. United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 502 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 149. Id. at 702, 705. 
 150. Id. at 705. 
 151. The district court had elected not to question other jurors about the notation, which 
left the record devoid of evidence that may have rebutted the presumption. Id. 
 152. Id. at 707–08. 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1294–95 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining the goal of precluding incidental contact between jurors and nonjurors from 
coming before the court); United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1246–47 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(qualifying what contact pertains to the matter before the court). 
 154. See United States v. Henderson, 564 F. App’x 352, 367–68 (10th Cir. 2014); Stouffer 
v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). 
 155. United States v. Hawley, 660 F. App’x 702, 709 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 156. See id. 
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offense.157  The very juror behavior that ultimately led the Fourth Circuit to 
vacate a defendant’s conviction would not have been contemplated as 
Remmer-worthy in the Tenth Circuit. 
4.  Sometimes Automatic:  The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit is best categorized as a “semi-Remmer circuit” 
because it epitomizes the indecision and disagreement among its sister 
circuits.  In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit held that a prima facie showing of 
extrinsic evidence presumes prejudice.158  It even formulated factors to 
determine what showing satisfies the rebuttal burden borne by the 
government.159  However, in the same case, the court noted its previous 
departure from Remmer in two cases decided sixteen years prior.160 
More recently, in a 2017 case, the Eleventh Circuit presumed that 
interactions between the defendant’s friends and jurors had prejudiced that 
trial.161  Although seemingly reiterating its adherence to Remmer, the 
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s holding that the government 
had carried its burden where the jurors at issue had proclaimed their ability 
to remain impartial throughout trial.162  In that sense, the word of a 
potentially partial jury was sufficient to confirm its own impartiality.  Thus, 
the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a relaxed stance on procedural burdens and 
presumptions in the face of jury taint allegations.163 
5.  Discretionary Use:  The Eighth Circuit 
Last, while the Eighth Circuit claims to abide by Remmer, it narrowly and 
selectively applies the presumption.164  The Eighth Circuit has previously 
declared that a defendant is not entitled to a Remmer hearing or presumption 
 
 157. See supra notes 144–46 (discussing United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 
2012)). 
 158. United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006) (encompassing both 
outside influence and juror misconduct). 
 159. Id. at 1299–300.  The following factors identify when the government has successfully 
rebutted the presumption:  “(1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which 
the information reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner 
of the court’s inquiry into the juror issues; and (4) the strength of the government’s case.” Id. 
at 1300. 
 160. Id. at 1299 n.36 (first citing United States v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654, 656–57 (11th Cir. 
1990); and then citing United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 870 (11th Cir. 1990)).  In 
the same footnote, the Eleventh Circuit recognized and recited “the apparent conflict between 
the standard pronounced in Rowe and the unambiguous mandate of Remmer,” which it then 
refused to resolve. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 n.3 (11th Cir. 
1994)). 
 161. United States v. Schlecht, 679 F. App’x 817, 818 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See also Kerr, supra note 114, at 1463 (characterizing the Eleventh Circuit as having 
no articulated standard). 
 164. But see United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2012) (including the 
Eighth Circuit among those circuits that do not follow Remmer). 
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for points of law165 or factual evidence developed at trial.166  In fact, the 
Eighth Circuit has restricted Remmer to cases “with facts like Remmer[],” 
which it categorizes purely as instances of outside communication or 
tampering.167  Moreover, where a defendant alleges taint or outside influence 
within the Eighth Circuit’s designated Remmer territory, the court calls on 
Remmer to supplement, not govern, the analysis.168 
Should district courts in the Eighth Circuit deem a Remmer hearing 
appropriate, they then retain discretion to assign the burden to either party 
after having reviewed the case’s facts.169  For instance, in United States v. 
Harris-Thompson,170 the district court investigated potential contact between 
members of the defendant’s family and the jurors.171  The court questioned 
the potentially compromised jurors, weighed the gravity of the allegations 
against the likelihood that they occurred, and determined the concerns would 
not have prejudiced the verdict.172  This result departs from the classic 
Remmer recipe, neither presuming prejudice nor asking the government to 
rebut.173  Instead, the district court used Remmer as guidance to investigate, 
leaving the execution of that inquiry subject to the court’s discretion.174 
While cloaked as a Remmer circuit, the Eighth Circuit resembles Olano 
circuits, asking what effect, if any, an intrusion had on the jury’s deliberation 
and verdict.175  The following section explores the Phillips and Olano 
circuits’ departures from Remmer and the procedures they formulated to 
replace it. 
B.  The Phillips and Olano Circuits 
Other circuits have sharply deviated from Remmer’s presumption.  
Specifically, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have instead 
adopted the standards articulated in Phillips or Olano.  This section explores 
the Phillips circuits and Olano circuits in turn. 
 
 165. United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that, even 
when substantive, issues of law are beyond the jury’s consideration and therefore cannot 
prejudice the defendant under Remmer). 
 166. United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1167 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See generally United States v. Harris-Thompson, 751 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 169. Tucker, 137 F.3d at 1030 (discussing how the court could not ascertain from the case’s 
facts whether to apply the presumption and shift the burden); see also Harris-Thompson, 751 
F.3d at 597 (“[T]he court understood the inquiry that Remmer and other cases required and 
attempted to fashion a procedure . . . .”). 
 170. 751 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 171. Id. at 598. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See generally id. 
 174. See id. at 596–97. 
 175. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Honken, 541 
F.3d 1146, 1167 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1030 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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1.  Phillips Circuits 
In contrast to the Remmer circuits, Phillips circuits interpret the majority 
opinion in Phillips to have restricted the entitlements allotted to defendants 
under Remmer.176  Where Remmer previously awarded defendants the right 
to a hearing and a presumption of prejudice at that hearing, Phillips now 
limits Remmer’s rule to a hearing alone.177  Under this view, a prima facie 
showing of jury taint is no longer presumed to have prejudiced a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.  Eliminating the presumption converts the hearing into an 
opportunity for the defendant to persuade the court of prejudice, rather than 
an opportunity for the government to show juror impartiality.  Thus, Phillips 
circuits repackage the government’s burden as the defendant’s at a 
hearing.178 
Specifically, the Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits make up the Phillips 
circuits.  The Sixth Circuit outwardly rejects the presumption of prejudice.179  
The Fifth and D.C. Circuits acknowledge the presumption’s theoretical 
existence, but they place it just out of a defendant’s reach.  Instead, a 
defendant in the Fifth or D.C. Circuit must additionally establish a likelihood 
of prejudice on top of the initial prima facie showing.180  These sections first 
explore the Sixth Circuit and then explore the Fifth and D.C. Circuits. 
a.  Goodbye Remmer:  The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit abandoned the Remmer presumption after the Supreme 
Court decided Phillips.181  It finds Phillips to have reinterpreted Remmer, 
shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant to demonstrate that alleged 
outside contact with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality.182  As such, a 
defendant in the Sixth Circuit retains the burden in a Remmer hearing, and 
“[p]rejudice is not to be presumed.”183 
 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 
521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 177. See supra note 176. 
 178. See supra note 176. 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 407 F. App’x 32, 36 (6th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, 
in light of Phillips and Olano, the government should only be required to rebut after a court 
determines a likelihood of prejudice); United States v. Edelin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15 (D.D.C. 
2003) (discussing how this court first has discretion to convene a hearing and, that when it 
does, it only applies the presumption to a sufficient likelihood of prejudice). 
 181. Pennell, 737 F.2d at 532.  In the Sixth Circuit, Remmer no longer governs the question 
of burden; it only “controls the question of how the district court should proceed where such 
allegations are made, i.e., a hearing must be held during which the defendant is entitled to be 
heard.” Id. 
 182. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 95 (“This Court has consistently held that Smith v. Phillips 
reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placing 
a heavy burden on the government.”); see also Davis, 407 F. App’x at 36–37. 
 183. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 95 (quoting Pennell, 737 F.2d at 532). 
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In a recent case, the defendant reported having received a LinkedIn 
notification from a member of the community where he stood trial and had 
been convicted.184  After some additional research, the defendant learned that 
this person was the live-in girlfriend of one of the jurors.185  The defendant 
presented the court with evidence that the juror had disclosed details of the 
ongoing trial to his girlfriend, after which she had searched Google for 
additional details.186  The first page of search results included information 
that the court had specifically precluded the government from presenting at 
trial.187  Thus, not only had the juror violated his oath by discussing details 
of the trial, but he also may have learned information that threatened to 
prejudice the proceedings.188 
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to conduct a 
Remmer hearing, explaining that the defendant would be entitled to a new 
trial on all counts if the district court found prejudice.189  If the district court 
did not, the Sixth Circuit continued, the defendant’s convictions would 
stand.190  The district court convened a Remmer hearing, at which the 
defendant was not entitled to a presumption and was expected to prove actual 
prejudice.191  His inability to do so resulted in the reinstatement of all 
convictions.192 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit’s retreat from Remmer’s presumption places 
greater onus on the defendant to show juror partiality.  For defendants 
alleging a tainted jury, the path to a new trial is far more arduous in the Sixth 
Circuit than in others.193 
b.  A Sufficient Likelihood:  The Fifth and D.C. Circuits 
Moreover, the Fifth194 and D.C.195 Circuits grant district courts discretion 
to apply a presumption, but they limit its application to few circumstances.  
Even when addressing jury tampering, which directly mirrors the facts of 
 
 184. United States v. Harris, 881 F.3d 945, 952 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 952–53. 
 187. Id. at 952. 
 188. Id. at 953–54. 
 189. Id. at 954. 
 190. Id.; see also United States v. Lanier, 870 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Subject to 
review by this court, if the Remmer hearing reveals that any external influence prejudicially 
affected jury deliberations, defendants are entitled to a new trial, but if the Remmer hearing 
reveals that no external influence prejudicially affected jury deliberations, defendants’ 
convictions must be reinstated.”). 
 191. United States v. Harris, No. 15CR335-2, 2018 WL 3869579, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 
15, 2018). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Compare id. (reinstating a conviction where a defendant could not produce evidence 
of actual prejudice), with United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 502 F.3d 700, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(reversing a conviction where the government could not rebut presumed prejudice). 
 194. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 932–33 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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Remmer, the Fifth Circuit has not presumed prejudice.196  In one case, 
unidentified third parties phoned two jurors and asked for details about the 
case, requested that another juror be lenient on the defendants, and delivered 
a mysterious package to another juror’s home.197  The Fifth Circuit declined 
to presume that such contact would have prejudiced the jury, stating that the 
presumption “cannot survive Phillips and Olano.”198 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit must find a sufficient “likelihood of prejudice” 
before it shifts the burden to the government.199  In United States v. Williams-
Davis,200 the defendants asserted numerous instances of juror misconduct, 
alleging that the jurors partook in conversations with third parties, read 
newspaper articles, relied on dictionaries to define legal terms, deliberated 
prematurely amongst themselves, and withheld information during voir 
dire.201  In reviewing each allegation, the D.C. Circuit explained that its 
standard is not whether the defendant proffered evidence, but it is whether 
the alleged circumstances are sufficiently likely to produce prejudice.202  It 
held that these facts were insufficient and declined to apply the 
presumption.203  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit views the presumption as not 
“particularly forceful,” if it even applies at all.204 
While the Sixth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits agree that Remmer entitles a 
defendant to a hearing, they conclude that Phillips removed the presumption 
and refrain from requiring the government to show harmlessness.  
Defendants standing trial in these circuits therefore retain the burden of 
proving prejudice throughout each stage of the court’s inquiry.205 
2.  Olano Circuits 
Pivoting to Olano, the First and Ninth Circuits supplant the burden-shifting 
framework with a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the alleged jury taint 
impacts a defendant’s substantive rights.  Such determinations lean heavily 
on district judges’ experience and discretion.  This subsection explores the 
First Circuit and Ninth Circuit in turn. 
a.  Merit-Based Claims:  The First Circuit 
The First Circuit engages in Justice O’Connor’s specific analysis to 
address the merits of jury taint allegations and to determine whether 
 
 196. See Sylvester, 143 F.3d at 933–34 (finding that the defendant bears the burden even 
where third parties pressured several jurors to tamper with the verdict). 
 197. Id. at 931–32. 
 198. Id. at 934; see also United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 288 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that “[i]n the wake of [Phillips] and Olano,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
“Remmer is a dead letter”). 
 199. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 497. 
 200. 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 201. See generally id. 
 202. Id. at 496–97. 
 203. Id. at 497. 
 204. Id. at 496. 
 205. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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Remmer’s presumption should apply.206  A district judge will investigate an 
allegation by “assessing the magnitude and extent of any prejudice 
caused.”207  Upon finding a colorable claim, the district courts weigh the risk 
of influence to a juror against the juror’s testimony that he can (or did) remain 
impartial.208  Judges then reserve discretion to designate the appropriate 
method of investigation.209  When a court identifies jury taint and its 
likelihood of prejudicing a jury, the court may cure it in any number of ways, 
including:  discharging particular jurors, giving new instructions, or granting 
a mistrial.210 
In United States v. Zimny,211 the defendant appealed his case after learning 
that former jurors had posted details about his trial to a blog forum.212  The 
trial court interviewed one suspected former juror, but it did not investigate 
the other.213  On appeal, the First Circuit determined that an investigation 
into the unexamined juror’s contact was necessary; yet, it noted a trial court’s 
broad discretion to shape that investigation’s rigor and depth.214  Thus, First 
Circuit courts deviate from the categorical approaches espoused in Remmer 
and Phillips.  Rather, they conduct fact-intensive inquiries aimed at analyzing 
the merits of each allegation before they commit to a course of action. 
b.  Jury Tampering Is Different:  The Ninth Circuit 
Like the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit conducts a fact-intensive inquiry 
to discern whether alleged jury taint may warrant a Remmer presumption.  To 
determine whether the misconduct or extraneous influences merit a 
presumption, Ninth Circuit courts consider a variety of factors, such as the 
seriousness of the allegations, the content of the allegations, and the 
credibility of the information’s source.215 
Specifically, this circuit distinguishes between jury tampering, on the one 
hand, and other juror misconduct or improper contact, on the other.216  United 
 
 206. See United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 287–92 (1st Cir. 2002); see also United 
States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 50–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing First Circuit jurisprudence). 
 207. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52. 
 208. Id. at 52–53 (identifying how a threatening gesture may impact the trial by evaluating 
the risk of (1) a juror associating the threat with the defendant and (2) influence on the juror’s 
deliberation process); see supra Part II.A.5 (likening the Eighth Circuit’s process to the Olano 
circuits’ processes). 
 209. United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 465 (1st Cir. 2017) (“The touchstone is 
reasonableness:  did the trial court fashion, and then even-handedly implement, a sensible 
procedure reasonably calculated to determine whether something untoward had occurred?” 
(quoting United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 249–50 (1st Cir. 2001))). 
 210. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289. 
 211. 846 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 212. Id. at 461–64. 
 213. Id. at 465, 467–68. 
 214. Id. at 467, 472. 
 215. United States v. Brande, 329 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 216. Brande, 329 F.3d at 1176 (distinguishing the facts of Remmer from later cases, like 
Olano, because jury tampering clearly deserves a presumption). 
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States v. Henley217 addressed an attempt to bribe jurors for a verdict favorable 
to the defendant.218  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court 
had erred by not immediately presuming prejudice and assigning a burden to 
the government.219  Because jury tampering is “qualitatively more 
prejudicial” than other kinds of extraneous influence, the court reasoned, it 
merits Remmer’s automatic presumption.220  Thus, pursuant to Olano, the 
type of intrusion instructs when to presume prejudice. 
As evidenced above, the circuit split is a far cry from clean cut.  The 
following section dives deeper to examine how posture complicates the 
doctrine and compounds the existing split. 
C.  Habeas Corpus Overlay 
Habeas corpus cases complicate the inquiries into whether to rely on 
Remmer’s presumption and by what standard to review allegations of jury 
taint.  As background, defendants convicted in state systems may petition 
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus—a collateral attack221—by 
asserting that a constitutional right has been violated.222  When reviewing a 
state court’s decision, a federal court examines whether the decision (1) was 
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law 
or (2) was predicated on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented 
at trial.223  Thus, a federal court’s review of habeas corpus cases contrasts 
with the abuse of discretion standard typical of cases on direct appeal.224  
Moreover, the federal court must also determine that the state court’s error 
“actually prejudiced” the defendant.225 
In sum, the habeas posture changes a federal court’s calculus.  It requires 
a defendant to carry the burden of persuasion throughout each aspect of the 
case, and it affords the state court a graciously forgiving standard of 
review.226  Of the three foundational Supreme Court cases, only Phillips was 
a habeas case.  Accordingly, there is an implicit question of whether Phillips 
is comparable to Remmer despite the difference between defendants’ rights 
on appeal. 
 
 217. 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 218. See generally id. 
 219. Id. at 1118–19 (remanding the case for further investigation). 
 220. Id. at 1115 (explaining that jury tampering directly implicates a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial). 
 221. Collateral attacks afford the defendant an indirect means to be heard in federal court 
after the defendant has exhausted all state remedies. 
 222. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
 223. Id. 
 224. For examples of cases on direct appeal in which the abuse of discretion standard was 
applied, see United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 680 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Vega, 
285 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 225. Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 239 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bauberger v. Haynes, 
632 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 226. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (explaining that the standard of review 
must be lenient since collateral attacks threaten “finality, comity, and federalism”). 
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Specifically, habeas petitioners who allege jury taint assert a violation of 
their Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.227  In Phillips, the defendant 
alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right, and he 
argued that such injury necessitated a writ of habeas corpus.228  In response, 
the Court focused its analysis on defining due process in cases of alleged 
taint, and it identified the procedure that due process requires.229  Even where 
outside influences tiptoe past procedural safeguards, like voir dire and trial 
instructions, a breach does not per se entitle a defendant to a new trial or 
vacated conviction.230  Rather, due process violations are appropriately 
remedied by evidentiary hearings.231  To hold that a breach necessitates a 
writ of habeas corpus, as the lower courts had in Phillips, would suggest that 
due process requires more of state courts than of federal courts.232  Therefore, 
where a state court convenes a hearing, the state court has complied with due 
process requirements.233 
A Sixth Amendment injury—not due process—entitles the defendant to a 
new trial or writ of habeas corpus.234  As the moving party, the defendant 
bears the burden of demonstrating an injury to his Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury.235  Upon making this showing, the defendant will have 
adduced sufficient evidence for the reviewing court to grant a writ of habeas 
corpus or mandate a new trial.236  Short of this showing, the defendant has 
not alleged a Sixth Amendment injury and is therefore not entitled to a new 
trial or writ.237 
The unique procedural criteria inherent to habeas cases overlay the 
existing circuit split with even more confusion.  A circuit court’s relationship 
to Remmer may turn on its understanding of Phillips.  Whether it views the 
habeas posture as relevant to a defendant’s entitlements on appeal instructs 
whether it views Phillips as an exception to Remmer’s rule or as a limitation 
on Remmer’s power.  The following part addresses, in part, how posture 
informs a circuit’s review. 
 
 227. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 214 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment); 
Barnes, 751 F.3d at 239 (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 
1205, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (Sixth Amendment); Hall v. Zenk, 692 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 
2012) (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 228. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 214, 217. 
 229. Id. at 217. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 217–18; Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1031–33 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 232. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 218 (reasoning that a Remmer hearing in federal court complies 
with constitutional requirements). 
 233. See id. at 221 (limiting federal review in habeas cases since federal courts reviewing 
federal habeas actions “hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may 
intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension”). 
 234. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1033. 
 235. Id.; see supra Part I.C (discussing burden-shifting). 
 236. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1033; see also Lang v. Bobby, 889 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(distinguishing a habeas petitioner’s case from the direct appeal precedent on which he relied). 
 237. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1033 (“Until [the defendant] shows actual prejudice, he has shown 
only a due process violation—for denial of an opportunity to prove prejudice—and not yet a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.”). 
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III.  ADJUSTING THE LEGAL SANDBOX 
This part argues that courts can harmonize the three Supreme Court cases 
that sparked the circuit split.  Despite a deepening split, circuits begin their 
analyses in the same manner.  First, each defendant must make out a 
colorable claim of jury taint.238  This showing permits the court to address 
the basic dimensions of an intrusion, asking what happened and what impact 
it had on the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Courts further agree that a 
sufficient showing entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing.239  They 
diverge, however, in how they perceive the presumption and allocate its 
burdens. 
This part argues that the inquiry into whether to apply or reject Remmer’s 
presumption is too narrow, rendering subsequent procedure too rigid.  This 
Note makes three observations to reconcile the Court’s seemingly disparate 
holdings and to recommend a unified analysis moving forward.  First, this 
part distinguishes between prehearing and posthearing remedies,240 and it 
then argues that timing instructs different burdens within the same legal 
framework.  Second, this part argues that Olano extends, rather than limits, 
Remmer’s presumption.  Third, this part analyzes where procedural posture 
confuses circuit analysis, and it seeks to disentangle the different standards.  
These three considerations, taken together, bridge the gaps in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  Last, this part proposes a path forward for circuits to redress 
jury taint in the digital era. 
A.  Prehearing Versus Posthearing Remedies 
This section argues that Remmer and Phillips should be understood as 
individual developments in the legal framework, not as conflicting 
propositions about presumptions.  Their relationship turns largely on whether 
a claim of jury taint is prehearing or posthearing.  Where the trial court 
previously refused to convene a hearing, Remmer governs.  Where the trial 
court granted a hearing, Phillips explains that the defendant bears the burden 
of persuasion. 
Some circuits have grounded their rejection of Remmer in the Phillips 
Court’s highly debated and sometimes acclaimed line:  “This Court has long 
held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which 
the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”241  Circuits have 
inevitably latched onto the Court’s use of “the defendant,” reading Phillips 
to shift the burden from the government to the defendant.242  Yet the 
 
 238. See supra Parts I.C.1–2. 
 239. See supra Parts II.A–B.  Although, they disagree as to what evidence satisfies that 
threshold. 
 240. These labels refer respectively to when a court has yet to grant a hearing and has 
already agreed to convene one. 
 241. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982); accord United States v. Sylvester, 143 
F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532–33 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 242. See supra Part II.B (observing that some circuits view Phillips as having overruled 
Remmer). 
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surrounding phrases, “a hearing in which” and “to prove actual bias,” are 
more instructive.243 
The Remmer Court established the remedy for prehearing allegations.244  
As a matter of due process, the defendant is entitled to a hearing at which all 
parties examine the effect of outside influence on the jury.245  Since the lower 
courts in Remmer had denied the defendant an evidentiary hearing, they had 
denied him due process of the law.246  Without a further inquiry, the Supreme 
Court could at most presume that such contact with the jury prejudiced the 
defendant’s trial.247  By remanding the case for a hearing, the Supreme Court 
instructed future courts to gather all parties to the litigation before 
investigating extraneous influence.248  Either judicial inaction or ex parte 
responses to credible allegations of jury taint deprive the defendant of due 
process of the law.  Thus, Remmer prescribes a prehearing remedy to alleged 
jury taint as a measure of ensuring due process. 
In contrast, Phillips instructs the proper procedure posthearing.  In 
Phillips, the trial court had already convened an evidentiary hearing, only 
after which it concluded that such evidence had not prejudiced the 
defendant.249  In essence, the trial court in Phillips accorded the precise 
remedy called for by the Remmer Court.  The Supreme Court then ventured 
a step beyond the Remmer Court’s initial holding, endeavoring to establish 
what must happen during a hearing for the presiding court to vacate a 
conviction.250  By distinguishing between injuries to procedural rights and 
injuries to substantive rights, the Court quelled ambiguity about which 
remedy redresses which injury.251  The relief a defendant seeks must match 
the constitutional violation alleged.252 
Phillips explained that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of 
persuading a court to grant a mistrial or vacate a conviction. 253  Regardless 
of whether a court initially applies a presumption, the defendant bears this 
burden.  And even where a court initially presumes prejudice, thereby 
assigning a burden to the government, the defendant may carry this ultimate 
burden in one of two ways.  If the government cannot rebut, the defendant 
has carried his burden to persuade the court to grant a mistrial or vacate the 
conviction.  Alternatively, if the government does rebut the presumed 
 
 243. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215. 
 244. See generally Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 
 245. See, e.g., Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1031 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Remmer to 
demonstrate that “due process requires the opportunity to show” that the extraneous 
information tainted the jury). 
 246. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. 
 247. See infra Part III.B (discussing how the degree of intrusion merited a presumption). 
 248. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30. 
 249. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216–18 (1982) (explaining that the trial judge found 
no evidence to suggest prejudice). 
 250. See id. at 215; see supra Part II.C (discussing the difference between constitutional 
rights). 
 251. See generally Phillips, 455 U.S. 209. 
 252. See Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1031–33 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 253. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215 (citing prior Supreme Court cases that required actual 
bias). 
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prejudice, the defendant may carry his burden by demonstrating actual 
prejudice.  Irrespective of the presumption’s application or force, a defendant 
must carry this ultimate burden to persuade the presiding court to grant a 
mistrial or vacate a conviction. 
Thus, Phillips addressed a discrete issue than Remmer had contemplated.  
In fact, Phillips overlooked a presumption and instead addressed broader 
procedure.  Because the cases address distinct stages of the court’s inquiry, 
the appropriate lens for understanding their relationship first turns on whether 
a case is prehearing or posthearing.  Remmer protects the defendant’s right 
to an evidentiary hearing once he has made the requisite showing of jury 
taint.  Twenty-eight years later, Phillips reiterated Remmer’s holding by 
examining whether the trial court had afforded the defendant the very remedy 
Remmer had prescribed.  Upon finding it had, the Phillips Court deemed 
Remmer satisfied, and it moved forward to explain the defendant’s burden 
once at a hearing.  Therefore, Phillips does not reduce Remmer.  It lives 
alongside Remmer as a companion, establishing the defendant’s burden 
regardless of whether the evidence initially presumed prejudice. 
B.  Jury What?:  Expanding the Jury Taint Category 
While Phillips did not address the presumption’s applicability, Olano 
did.254  The Olano Court explained that the type of taint informs whether to 
presume prejudice.255  This section argues that Olano did not restrict 
Remmer, but it in fact expanded its holding by extending Remmer’s rule to 
other forms of taint. 
First, the Olano Court established that not all intrusions presume prejudice 
to the defendant.256  In that case, specifically, the Court focused on the kind 
of contact that should warrant a presumption.257  Instead of restricting 
Remmer to cases that share similar facts, as some Remmer circuits do,258 the 
Olano Court suggested that jury taint is amorphous.  In response, the proper 
lens for examining allegations must be equally flexible.  This analysis opened 
the door to other types of taint that would not have previously implicated 
Remmer. 
In doing so, Olano further reflects the importance of evaluating what types 
of intrusion may presume prejudice.259  The Olano Court cites Remmer as “a 
prime example,” recounting third-party contact with a juror, the appearance 
 
 254. See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
 255. See id. at 739. 
 256. Id. at 738–39 (assessing the impact on the verdict to discern which intrusions should 
presume prejudice). 
 257. Id. at 737.  The Court discusses Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which is a 
procedural dimension outside the scope of this Note. See generally id. 
 258. For examples of circuits that restrict Remmer’s doctrine to cases like Remmer, such as 
the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, see supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5. 
 259. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 737–38 (rejecting the facts in the case as insufficient). 
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of a bribe, and an FBI investigation.260  The Court found facts like Remmer’s 
to presume prejudice because their egregious nature threatens the integrity of 
a jury’s verdict to a greater extent than other intrusions may.261  Indeed, the 
circumstances in Remmer were sufficient to presume prejudice but not 
necessary.  Olano explains that lesser intrusions may equally merit a court’s 
attention.262  As such, Olano supplements Remmer by allowing courts to 
conduct “specific analys[es]” into circumstances that may not trigger the 
rebuttable presumption.263 
Remmer circuits have suggested that Olano undermines Remmer’s rule by 
permitting courts to decide between a presumption and a specific analysis.264  
However, this argument misunderstands that not all instances of jury taint 
result from third-party attempts to induce a verdict, nor should all presume 
prejudice.  To assume that any allegation, however small, merits a 
presumption would equip every defendant with sweepstake incentive to 
allege jury taint, and it would render few trials permissible.265  On the other 
hand, restricting the presumption to apply only to third-party intrusions 
discounts cases, like Olano, that do not involve outside influence.266  It would 
ignore juror misconduct completely, which would fissure Remmer’s 
entitlement and withhold remedial measures from defendants whose trials 
were made partial through misconduct. 
Accordingly, Olano did not constrain or weaken Remmer.  It left intact a 
court’s ability to presume prejudice when warranted, and it supplemented the 
types of activity that may prejudice a verdict.  Whether the intrusion entitles 
a defendant to a presumption at the hearing should not inform a court’s 
decision to convene one at all.  Instead, Olano recognizes that jury taint 
comes in many forms, not all of which will resemble facts so shocking as to 
presume prejudice on their face.  By distinguishing between the types of 
intrusions, courts are more apt to determine the effects on jury deliberations, 
the verdict, and defendants’ rights. 
Ultimately, special attention to how these three cases interact illustrates 
the underlying harmony among them.  Remmer examines a prehearing injury 
and redresses it by granting the defendant an entitlement to a hearing.  The 
facts of Remmer were sufficiently extreme to presume prejudice, but the 
 
 260. Id. at 738.  The Court further referenced the per se rules it established in Turner and 
Parker as replete with facts that confirmed prejudice to the defendant. See Parker v. Gladden, 
385 U.S. 363, 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 467–68 (1965). 
 261. Olano, 507 U.S. at 738 (collecting cases). 
 262. Compare Turner, 379 U.S. at 467–68 (per se prejudicial), and Remmer v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229–30 (1954) (presumed prejudicial), with Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 
560, 571–72 (1986) (not prejudicial), and Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984) (not 
prejudicial). 
 263. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 739. 
 264. See Hall v. Zenk, 692 F.3d 793, 800–02 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lawson, 677 
F.3d 629, 641–43 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 265. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (discussing policy concerns about 
permitting per se invalidation of trial proceedings). 
 266. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739; see also United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 462–66 (1st 
Cir. 2017). 
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Court neither endorsed nor foreclosed the use of a presumption in other 
situations.  Olano then explained how to presume prejudice, encouraging 
courts to conduct a specific analysis when presuming prejudice would not be 
appropriate.  Once at a hearing, Phillips governs what burden the defendant 
must bear before a reviewing court will vacate the conviction. 
C.  Collateral Attack Versus Direct Appeal 
Last, this section argues that a case’s posture influences how circuits have 
inconsistently applied the presumption, unnecessarily muddying the 
doctrine.  Remmer, a case on direct appeal, asked the Court to review for an 
abuse of discretion.267  Comparatively, this standard benefits the defendant 
because it gives a reviewing court full visibility into the evidence, logic, and 
discretion of the lower court.268  Because Phillips rose through the federal 
courts on a habeas action,269 the Court could not disturb anything short of a 
constitutional violation producing substantial and injurious effect on the 
verdict.270 
Some Remmer circuits point to the intentionally restrictive habeas 
procedure to suggest that Phillips may be altogether inconsistent with 
Remmer.271  These circuits either selectively apply the presumption to habeas 
cases, or they withhold it from habeas cases altogether.272  Specifically, 
Remmer circuits extend the presumption to cases on direct appeal, and they 
engage in a case-specific analysis to discern whether presumptions may ever 
apply in habeas cases.273 
The habeas petitioner must demonstrate in part that a state court’s decision 
contradicted or unreasonably applied existing Supreme Court precedent.274  
Therefore, to obtain relief in a Remmer circuit, a defendant may spotlight a 
state court’s refusal or failure to apply the presumption as evidence of that 
state court having violated clearly established federal law.275  A defendant 
may be successful in obtaining a writ where he can demonstrate that a state 
court’s failure to apply the presumption resulted in actual prejudice.276  
 
 267. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. 
 268. For examples of cases in which the abuse of discretion standard was used, see supra 
note 224.  For examples of cases with habeas posture, see Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 
1030 (6th Cir. 2019); Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 246–49 (4th Cir. 2014); Hall v. Zenk, 
692 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 269. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 218. 
 270. Id. at 218, 221.  While this is the majority’s position, the dissent argues that the habeas 
posture “poses no obstacle to this conclusion” since the Court could deem the state court’s 
findings unreliable and conduct its own inquiry. Id. at 243 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 271. See infra notes 273–83 and accompanying text. 
 272. See infra notes 273–83 and accompanying text. 
 273. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 n.5 (10th Cir. 2013); Hall, 692 
F.3d at 805. 
 274. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
 275. See, e.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 237–49 (4th Cir. 2014); Hall, 692 F.3d at 
804–06; Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326–28 (7th Cir. 2005).  But cf. Crease v. McKune, 
189 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the presumption is a rule of criminal 
procedure, not constitutional law, and therefore cannot apply in habeas cases). 
 276. See Hall, 692 F.3d at 805; Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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Especially in a circuit that strongly enforces the presumption, a defendant 
more easily satisfies the habeas burden. 
Alternatively, other Remmer circuits assert that habeas petitioners 
relinquish the right to a presumption altogether.277  Under this view, any 
defendant in either the state or federal system retains his right to a 
presumption so long as he appeals within the same system.278  When stepping 
outside of one system, however, the defendant forfeits that right.279  The 
Fourth Circuit previously explained this distinction when it noted how 
appellate state courts should have afforded one defendant a presumption.280  
Yet, since the state courts had not done so and the case had arrived at the 
Fourth Circuit through collateral attack, the circuit court could not restore 
that same right to the defendant.281  Thus, the potential success of a 
defendant’s claim hinges on how the reviewing circuit understands Remmer 
and its progeny.282 
These approaches unnecessarily restrict when, to whom, and to which case 
a rebuttable presumption may apply.  They complicate the doctrine and how 
circuits successively adopt it.  These approaches further insinuate that 
Phillips, for its habeas posture, is maximally an exception to the Remmer 
presumption instead of a companion case seeking to clarify federal law.283  
As discussed in Part III.A, however, courts can mend the brewing split by 
reconceptualizing the relationship between Remmer and Phillips. 
D.  Redressing Threats in a Digital Age 
This section suggests that contemplating the three categories offered above 
reconciles the case law and forges a path to redress jury taint in the face of 
advancing technologies.  It further urges that increased exposure to 
information expedites the need for reform. 
The rise of the digital age presents increased opportunities for juries to 
misbehave or to become the targets of outside influence.  Roughly ten years 
ago, federal courts and a handful of state courts rewrote their jury instructions 
to include bans on “tweeting, texting, blogging, emailing, or researching 
proceedings online.”284  Yet, despite efforts to adapt, courts still saw a rise in 
motions for mistrial due to internet-related misconduct.285  Thus, the added 
procedural mitigant did little to quash the ultimate effect on defendants’ 
 
 277. See, e.g., Barnes, 751 F.3d at 246–49; Hall, 692 F.3d at 804–06. 
 278. See supra note 277. 
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 280. Barnes, 751 F.3d at 252. 
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 282. See supra Part II.C. 
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and Olano for their postures, rather than Phillips, where the court was analyzing a case on 
direct appeal). 
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2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-juror/juror-could-face-charges-for-online-
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 285. See id. 
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rights.  Provided that technology has since advanced to grant users greater, 
quicker access to information, jury taint is increasingly more likely. 
Not only does technology erode traditional access barriers, but the societal 
moment may eventually call for a strictly technology-based approach to jury 
trials.  As the country navigates the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, courts are 
considering whether virtual trials are feasible.286  They are primarily 
contemplating the impact of separating the judge from the jury, how the jury 
may deliberate, and how to prevent jurors from conducting independent 
research.287 
This moment exposes how current procedural tools for preserving 
impartiality rely on the ability to sequester jurors or temporarily confine their 
access to phones or computers.288  In a virtual trial, what mechanisms ensure 
that jurors are not continuously texting each other?  How would a court 
prevent jurors from simultaneously researching whom they see or what they 
hear during the course of each party’s argument?  Without a court’s ability 
to monitor jurors at a physical trial, jurors are especially vulnerable to outside 
influence. 
Now consider not only the added structural obstacle that virtual trials 
present to detecting taint, but also consider the disagreement among courts 
as to what qualifies as taint and what course of action redresses an injury.  
The existing circuit split tasks a defendant in the Sixth Circuit with proving 
actual prejudice, while a defendant in the Fourth or Seventh Circuit presumes 
it.  The advent of the digital age amplifies this disparity, thereby creating 
greater impetus for courts to control the flow of information in and out of the 
jury box. 
By orienting where in the sandbox courts reside when initiating their 
analyses, courts can better pinpoint the rights and procedural safeguards that 
flow from Supreme Court case law.  As previously discussed, the remedy 
granted should match the injury sustained.289  Applying that logic to types of 
jury taint, this section disassembles jury taint into three smaller categories 
distinguished by the types of intrusion they pose to a trial’s fairness and a 
defendant’s rights in the digital age.  The three main lenses are:  jury 
tampering, which includes third-party inducements or threats intended to 
alter the verdict; outside influence, which includes third-party actions not 
intended to affect the verdict; and internal misconduct, which includes 
inappropriate juror conduct. 
 
 286. See Judiciary Preparedness for Coronavirus (COVID-19), U.S. CTS. (June 3, 2020), 
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1.  Jury Tampering 
Jury tampering is the most sinister of intrusions because it reflects a covert 
desire to tip the judicial scales to favor one party.  It directly threatens the 
core of the judicial process, and it “cuts to the heart of the Sixth 
Amendment[].”290  It conjures images of insidious characters who slip money 
through handshake agreements or approach vulnerable jurors on their 
commutes home. 
Applying the reasoning of both Remmer and Olano, third-party contact 
intended to influence the verdict is presumptively prejudicial.  It directly 
implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right because the intended 
outcome proactively seeks to alter the jury’s verdict.  Regardless of whether 
a case is brought on direct appeal or as a collateral attack, injury to the Sixth 
Amendment right evidences a sufficient intrusion to grant the defendant 
relief.  Thus, where a court faces credible allegations of jury tampering, the 
presiding court should grant the defendant a Remmer hearing and presume 
prejudice. 
2.  Outside Influence 
But what happens when a third party influences the jury without intending 
to?  Contact in this category especially blurs the lines between tampering and 
innocuous contact, ultimately underscoring the importance of first 
identifying the intrusion and its impact on the verdict.  As technology lowers 
many of the procedural hurdles implemented to insulate juries, courts must 
adjust how they define possible types of taint.  In today’s twenty-four-hour 
news cycle, jurors can never truly shield themselves from outside influence.  
A coworker or family friend may innocently refer to an ongoing story or news 
coverage about the case, or the juror may overhear information regarding the 
case while commuting.  There are endless possibilities for how extraneous 
information may unintentionally seep into a juror’s routine. 
Recognizing where Olano instructs the proper procedure is integral to 
crafting a proportionate response.  While some outside contact may per se 
taint the verdict, as in Parker and Turner,291 other types may not.  Olano’s 
flexible standard permits courts to adjust their calculus by balancing the 
likelihood of prejudice to the defendant with the remedial measures it 
assigns.  Accordingly, a fact-intensive inquiry best equips courts to 
differentiate between meritorious and nonmeritorious allegations of outside 
influence. 
3.  Internal Juror Misconduct 
Juror misconduct has become the biggest blind spot of Remmer’s rule.292  
As the doctrinal lens largely focuses on preventing outside-in contact, it 
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 292. See supra Part II (discussing the circuit split). 
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cannot fully account for what happens when a jury self-infects.  What good 
is fortifying the exterior when jurors themselves are capable of precipitating 
the taint?  As circuits have largely disagreed on how to apply Remmer to 
instances of juror misconduct, clearly defining its borders and procedure 
remains a crucial concern.  Again, Olano’s flexible standard is particularly 
instructive for diagnosing potential misconduct.  That said, the first step is 
recognizing that juror misconduct squarely falls within Remmer’s rule293—
especially as the possibility for misconduct looms. 
4.  Protecting the Sixth Amendment 
The different standards by which circuits evaluate jury taint ultimately 
entitle defendants to varying degrees of constitutional protection at trial.  The 
Sixth Amendment promises each criminal defendant the right to an impartial 
jury. Yet, divergent applications of Remmer’s rule call into question what is 
meant by “impartial.”  What one circuit determines to have infringed on the 
Sixth Amendment may not trigger the same response in a different circuit.294 
Consequently, a defendant’s right to contest proceedings rests largely on 
how that jurisdiction perceives outside information to influence them.  As 
advancing technology makes access to information more readily available, 
safeguarding defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights becomes harder and more 
important.  Resolving Remmer’s rule clarifies what intrusions impinge on 
juror impartiality, thereby better protecting Sixth Amendment interests. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1954, the Court first established that a prima facie case of jury tampering 
presumes prejudice to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.  
Over the almost forty years following, the Court developed its framework by 
defining criteria for lower courts to utilize when identifying potential 
intrusions on that right and, once detected, by supplying instructions to 
redress them.  Circuit courts are split over how they interpret these 
foundational cases, and they ultimately contemplate them as contradictory 
instead of complementary.  Further, circuits’ varying treatment of habeas 
corpus has overlaid the existing split with even more ambiguity. 
By broadening and reframing how courts assess jury taint, however, courts 
can harmonize the case law.  Remmer established a defendant’s right to an 
evidentiary hearing.  Years later, Olano expanded courts’ investigatory 
discretion by permitting them to either presume prejudice, as the Court did 
in Remmer, or to conduct a special analysis.  Phillips reiterated a defendant’s 
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right to a hearing, and it instructed courts to find actual prejudice before 
contemplating a mistrial, vacating a conviction, or granting a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
As technology advances, juries become more susceptible to outside 
influence, and the circuit split deepens.  Consequently, defendants receive 
varying degrees of constitutional protection depending on where they stand 
trial.  Adopting new standards and categories permits courts to holistically 
evaluate modern contaminants while also protecting defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights to an impartial jury. 
